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This paper estimates the eﬀects of inﬂation targeting (IT)
adoption over inﬂation dynamics using a wide control group.
We contribute to the current IT evaluation literature by con-
sidering the adoption of IT by a country as a treatment, just
as in the program evaluation literature. Hence, we perform
propensity score matching to ﬁnd suitable counterfactuals to
the actual inﬂation targeters. We ﬁnd out that IT has helped
in reducing the level and volatility of inﬂation in the countries
that adopted it. This result is robust to alternative deﬁnitions
of treatment and control groups.
JEL Codes: C50, E42, E52.
Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of central banks
have adopted an inﬂation targeting (IT) regime as a monetary pol-
icy framework, spurring research on the beneﬁts of such a policy
scheme.1 Theoretical work suggests that the sound implementation
of an IT regime delivers “optimal” equilibrium, in the sense of an-
choring inﬂation around a target with relatively low inﬂation and,
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1To date, twenty-one countries follow an explicit IT framework and other coun-
tries are considering its adoption. See, for example, Truman (2003) and Pe´tursson
(2004).
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if “ﬂexible,” low output volatility.2 However, whether IT has led to
a superior monetary policy performance or has induced macroeco-
nomic beneﬁts in the countries that adopted it (ITers henceforth) is
deﬁnitely an empirical matter.
A fundamental element to be taken into account in any empirical
work is the appropriate success measure. From the onset, we make a
distinction between relative and absolute success criteria. Absolute
criteria refer to a type of policy evaluation that accounts gains in
macroeconomic outcomes without reference to alternative policies
that might have achieved the same outcomes. Relative criteria, on
the other side, evaluate a particular policy framework in comparison
to others to assess whether the former is superior.
The verdict of the absolute criteria about IT success is over-
whelmingly one:3 “IT has been beneﬁcial.” To our knowledge, there
is no empirical work that has found that IT has delivered worse
outcomes in comparison to preadoption ones.4 On the other hand,
the relative criteria have not yet yielded a clear-cut conclusion. This
approach would attempt to answer questions like does inﬂation tar-
geting make a diﬀerence? or does inﬂation targeting matter? From a
policy evaluation view, this is the relevant criteria at which we need
to look.
Our goal is to evaluate the behavior of inﬂation dynamics brought
about by the adoption of IT. We do so by studying three measures
that distinguish inﬂation dynamics: mean, variance, and persistence.
Key questions emerge from the study of these measures.
First, IT has been adopted by countries either to credibly dis-
inﬂate (or converge) or, as asserted by some authors, to lock in the
gains obtained from episodes of disinﬂation. Would countries have
done better or worse had they adopted any other regime?
Second, it is generally stated that inﬂation uncertainty results
from factors exogenous to the scope of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy (terms of trade or supply shocks, for instance) as
well as from monetary policy shocks. In this sense, inﬂation can be
made less uncertain up to the limits set out by the amount of exoge-
nous uncertainty. Modern monetary policy practice, whether IT or
2See, for example, Svensson (2000).
3See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002),
and Corbo, Landarretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002).
4See Neumann and von Hagen (2002) for a recent empirical survey.
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not, hinges precisely on making monetary policy more predictable
and hence less uncertain. Once again, a fair question for a coun-
try that adopted IT is whether inﬂation uncertainty has fallen more
or less in comparison to the counterfactual situation of not having
adopted IT.
Last, the theory of IT emphasizes that the overall features of
the framework are built upon the pillar of credibility. Credibility is
understood as the ability the central bank has to anchor medium- to
long-run expectations, to avoid expectation traps that may render
persistently high or low inﬂation rates. On the other hand, “ﬂexible”
IT implies that shocks that drive inﬂation away from the target
should revert at a pace that does not harm real activity. Hence, the
speed of adjustment seems to depend on the degree of ﬂexibility.5 Too
fast an adjustment is equivalent to a strict IT, likely in situations
whereby the central bank needs to gain or strengthen credibility.
When the adjustment is slow, a more ﬂexible IT is in place. In the
fast-adjustment case, undue real volatility might emerge, whereas
in the slow-adjustment case either credibility is strong enough that
the central bank can reap some beneﬁts of ﬂexibility or the nominal
anchor is lost and the inﬂation falls to the expectation trap.
Thus, the eﬀects of IT adoption on persistence are ambiguous.
More persistence can result from successful ﬂexible ITers or unsuc-
cessful ITers not gaining credibility. Once more, what does an empir-
ical evaluation of IT over persistence tell about the adopting ITers?
In recent years, a growing body of literature has provided in-
sights on the empirical assessment of IT. Corbo, Landarretche, and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), for instance, compare policies and outcomes
in fully ﬂedged IT countries to two groups, potential ITers and non-
ITers. They ﬁnd that sacriﬁce ratios were lower in ITers, that IT
countries have reduced inﬂation forecast errors, and that inﬂation
persistence has declined strongly among ITers.
Johnson (2002), by comparing ﬁve ITers to six non-ITers, all
of them in industrialized economies, ﬁnds that the period after the
announcement of IT is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant re-
duction in the level of expected inﬂation. Also, he ﬁnds that IT has
not reduced absolute average forecast errors in targeting countries
relative to those in nontargeting countries. However, ITers did avoid
5See Svensson (1999).
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even larger forecast errors than those that would have occurred in
the absence of IT.
On the other hand, Neumann and von Hagen (2002) consider a
group of six industrial IT countries and three non-IT countries and
perform an event study to quantify the response of inﬂation and long-
run as well as short-run interest rates to supply shocks (increases
in the world oil price in 1978–79 and in 1998–996). They ﬁnd that
the eﬀect of IT is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for average
inﬂation, but it is for interest rates, meaning a gain in credibility
among ITers.
Pe´tursson (2004) analyzes a bigger sample (twenty-one ITers)
that includes developing economies. He evaluates the performance
of a set of macroeconomic outcomes using a dummy variable for pre-
and post-IT periods on a country basis and ﬁnds that IT has been
beneﬁcial to reduce the level, persistence, and variability of inﬂa-
tion.7 However, the technique oﬀered by this study does not tackle
the fundamental question of relative performance. Its contribution
hinges in giving a clear and robust account for the evidence of the
absolute beneﬁts of IT and corroborates previous ﬁndings on this
line.
Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) study inﬂation persistence us-
ing ﬁve industrial ITers that are compared to seven industrial non-
ITers. The study performs univariate regressions on inﬂation for each
country and ﬁnds that inﬂation persistence is estimated to be quite
low within ITers, whereas the unit root hypothesis cannot be re-
jected for non-ITers. Levin and Piger (2004), on the other hand, in
a similar empirical framework with twelve industrial countries, allow
for structural breaks and ﬁnd that inﬂation, in general, exhibits low
persistence.8 They also suggest that IT does not seem to have had
a large impact on long-term expected inﬂation for a group of eleven
emerging market economies.
6This type of shock creates a dilemma because it implies more inﬂation coupled
with a downturn of economic activity.
7There are other studies that provide mixed evidence about inﬂation persis-
tence. Benati (2004) and Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) ﬁnd that inﬂation
has become less persistent within the OECD and especially IT countries.
8These results conﬁrm those of Benati (2004), which studies inﬂation dynamics
in twenty OECD countries.
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Finally, Ball and Sheridan (2005) provide evidence on the irrele-
vance of IT. They look at seven OECD countries that adopted IT in
the early 1990s and thirteen countries that did not. They claim that
ITers that reduced higher-than-average inﬂation rates toward equi-
librium levels were merely reﬂecting regression to the mean and not
a proper eﬀect of IT. Once they control for regression to the mean,
they conclude that IT did not improve macroeconomic performance.
In their words, “ Just as short people on average have children who
are taller than they are, countries with unusually high and unstable
inﬂation tend to see these problems diminish, regardless of whether
they adopt inﬂation targeting.”
In our view, rather than challenging the previous evidence and
beliefs about IT eﬀects, the crucial point of the claim made in Ball
and Sheridan (2005) is methodological. If there is an ITer with poor
performance before IT, then it should be compared with a non-ITer
with equally poor initial performance. Otherwise, the targeting ef-
fect would be overstated. Here, we hinge precisely on this matter of
comparability.
Following Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005), we use
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator approach to evaluate the eﬀects
on key measures of inﬂation dynamics resulting from IT adoption.
As we argue later, the previous studies on this issue may suﬀer
from sample selection bias (a few industrialized countries, for in-
stance) and, importantly, select counterfactuals for the ITers in an
arbitrary fashion. Our contribution is twofold: First, we use all the
twenty-three IT experiences so far, the widest possible control group
of non-ITers (eighty-six countries), and diﬀerent possible dates of IT
adoption. With this, we understand IT as an alternative monetary
policy framework worldwide, for both industrialized and developing
economies. Second, we interpret the IT adoption as a “natural ex-
periment,” so we seek to reestablish the conditions of a randomized
experiment where the IT adoption mimics a treatment. This natu-
rally leads us to perform propensity score matching as an alternative
to the widely used regression approach. In a nutshell, we seek to
overcome the aforementioned methodological limitations by letting
the data select the controls for ITers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we
brieﬂy describe the propensity score and matching techniques for
evaluation; in section 2 we discuss some empirical issues regarding
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the robustness of our results and present the inﬂation outcomes to
be evaluated; in section 3 we show our main ﬁndings, while section 4
concludes and provides some avenues for future research.
1. Methodology
As mentioned, we use microeconometric techniques usually applied
in quasi-experimental contexts, borrowed from the program evalua-
tion literature. To be consistent with this literature in this section
we may refer to the adoption of IT as treatment, to the ITers as the
treated group, and to the non-ITers as the control group.
1.1 The Fundamental Problem
Let D be a binary indicator that equals one if a country has adopted
IT and zero otherwise. Also, let Y 1t denote the value of a certain
outcome in period t if the country has adopted the IT regime and
Y 0t if not. Given a set of observable country attributesX, the average
eﬀect of being an ITer on Yt is9
ξ =E
[(
Y 1t −Y 0t
)∣∣X, D = 1]=E[Y 1t ∣∣X, D=1]− E[Y 0t ∣∣X, D =1].
(1)
It is clear from (1) that we face an identiﬁcation problem since
E[Y 0t |X, D = 1] is not observable. It is convenient to rewrite (1)
in a slightly diﬀerent way, closer to what we actually use in our em-
pirical work. Suppose that IT was adopted in period k. Then, for
t > k > t′, (1) is equivalent to
ξ = E
[(
Y 1t − Y 0t′
)∣∣X, D = 1]− E[(Y 0t − Y 0t′ )∣∣X, D = 1]. (2)
This way of representing ξ allows us to exploit the panel data nature
of the sample, and hence to control for ﬁxed factors that could be
correlated with the outcomes (for instance, most developed countries
having less volatile inﬂation rates).
A common approach to estimate the expectation E
[(
Y 0t −
Y 0t′
)∣∣X, D = 1] is to replace it with the observable average outcome
9The quantity ξ refers to what is deﬁned in the literature as the average
treatment eﬀect on the treated, i.e., the average eﬀect of IT only across those
countries that adopted the regime.
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in the untreated state E[(Y 0t −Y 0t′ ) |X, D = 0].10 However, this could
result in biased estimates of ξ from two sources.11 The ﬁrst arises
from the presence of ITers in the sample that are not comparable with
non-ITers and vice versa. The second is due to diﬀerent distributions
of X between the treated and the control groups, which is usual in
nonrandomized samples (like a data set of countries). Fortunately,
matching methods deal with these shortcomings.
1.2 Matching Methods
Matching techniques seek to eliminate the aforementioned biases by
pairing ITers with non-ITers that have similar observed characteris-
tics. The goal is to estimate a suitable counterfactual for each ITer,
and hence attribute the diﬀerence between the ITer’s outcome and
that of a matched counterfactual to the treatment.
The key identifying assumption is that we can reestablish the con-
ditions of a randomized experiment (that is, random assignment of
X) when no such data are available. This means that countries with
the same observable characteristics face a randomized experiment as
to whether they receive the treatment or not. A direct implication
of such an assumption is that if there are any omitted variables that
explain whether the treatment is received, and if these variables are
important for outcomes, then identiﬁcation may not be achieved.
1.2.1 The Propensity Score
Usually, determining along which dimension to match the coun-
tries or what type of weighting scheme to use is a diﬃcult task.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) reduce the dimensionality of this prob-
lem by suggesting that the match can be performed on the basis of
a single index that summarizes all the information from the observ-
able covariates. This index, the propensity score, is the probability
of treatment conditional on observable characteristics,
p(X) = E [D |X] = Pr (D = 1 |X) , (3)
and should satisfy the balancing hypothesis, which states that ob-
servations with the same propensity score must have the same
10See, for instance, Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005).
11See Heckman et al. (1998).
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distribution of X independently of the treatment status.12 Hence,
equation (2) can be rewritten as
ξ = E
[
(Y 1t − Y 0t′ ) | p(X), D = 1
]− E [(Y 0t − Y 0t′ ) | p(X), D = 1] .
(4)
The noncomparability bias can be eliminated by only consider-
ing countries within the common support, the intersection on the
real line of the supports of the distributions {p(X) | D = 1} and
{p(X) | D = 0}. The bias from diﬀerent distributions of X is elimi-
nated by reweighing the non-ITer observations.
Estimating the propensity score is straightforward, as any prob-
abilistic model suits (3). For instance, we can adopt the parametric
form Pr (Di = 1 |X i) = F (h(X i)), where F (.) is the logistic cumu-
lative distribution (a logit). However, two points are to be handled
with care. First, the estimation requires choosing a set of condition-
ing variables X that are not inﬂuenced by the adoption of the IT
regime. Otherwise, the matching estimator will not correctly mea-
sure the treatment eﬀect, because it will capture the (endogenous)
changes in the distribution ofX induced by the IT adoption. For this
reason, theX variables should measure country attributes before the
treatment.13 Second, the model selection, i.e., the form of h(X i), can
be used to test the balancing hypothesis. Dehejia and Wahba (2002)
suggest using a polynomial according to the following steps:
1. Start with a parsimonious logit speciﬁcation (i.e., h(X i)
linear).
2. Stratify all observations on the common support such that es-
timated propensity scores within a stratum for treated and
control countries are close. For example, start by dividing ob-
servations into strata of equal score range (0−0.2, . . . , 0.8−1).
3. For each interval, test whether the averages ofX of treated and
control units do not diﬀer. If covariates are balanced between
12Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that the conditions D ⊥ {Y 1, Y 0} | X
and 0 < p(X) < 1 together (strong ignorability of the treatment) are suf-
ﬁcient to identify the treatment eﬀect. In practice, we require a weaker and
testable condition of ignorability for identiﬁcation: conditional mean indepen-
dence, E[Y 0 | X , D] = E[Y 0 | X ] and E[Y 1 | X , D] = E[Y 1 | X ].
13However, even these variables could be inﬂuenced by the program through
the eﬀects of expectations.
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these groups for all strata, the speciﬁcation satisﬁes the bal-
ancing hypothesis.14 If the test fails in one interval, divide it
into smaller strata and reevaluate.
4. If a covariate is not balanced for many strata, a less parsimo-
nious speciﬁcation of h(X i) is needed. This can be achieved by
adding interaction and/or higher-order terms of the covariate.
It is important to emphasize that the role of the propensity score
is to reduce the dimensionality of the matching; it does not necessar-
ily convey a behavioral interpretation.15 Indeed, the logit regressions
do not seek to ﬁnd the determinants that made a central bank adopt
an IT regime, but to characterize and summarize the economic state
in which the ITers began to implement the regime. The diﬀerence is
subtle but allows us to control for variables that, although useful to
deﬁne the proﬁle of a particular economy (importantly, relative to
others), are not theoretically included in the central bank’s decision
to change the monetary policy regime.16
1.2.2 The Matched Estimator
Given the propensity score, there are various methods available for
ﬁnding a counterfactual for ITer i.17 Following Heckman, Ichimura,
and Todd (1997 and 1998), we can compute a consistent estimator
of the counterfactual by means of a kernel weighted average of out-
comes. This approach not only has good statistical properties, but is
also a convenient way to work with a sample of countries, as it could
be diﬃcult to ﬁnd an actual non-ITer for each ITer. Let C denote the
set of non-ITer countries whose propensity scores are over the region
of the common support. The counterfactual of the outcome Y 0i,t is
Y˜ 0i,t =
∑
j∈C Kb(pj − pi)Y 0j,t∑
j∈C Kb(pj − pi)
, (5)
14Actually, the speciﬁcation satisﬁes the weaker version of conditional mean
independence. See footnote 12.
15See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) for an attempt to interpret a cross-
sectional logit of the IT adoption in behavioral terms.
16In our empirical application we use a wide set of country attributes in mod-
eling the propensity score to reduce the odds of an omitted variable problem and
to minimize possible identiﬁcation problems (see section 2.2).
17See Smith and Todd (2005) for a review and examples.
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where Kb(z) = K
(
z
b
)
is a kernel function (with bandwidth parame-
ter b) that weights the outcome of country i inversely proportionally
to the distance between its propensity score value (pi) and the one
of the non-ITer j (pj).
Having found the matched pairs of ITers and non-ITers, the treat-
ment eﬀect estimator for country i in period t > k can be written
as
ξˆi,t =
(
Y 1i,t −
1
k − 1
k−1∑
τ=1
Y 0i,τ
)
−
(
Y˜ 0i,t −
1
k − 1
k−1∑
τ=1
Y˜ 0i,τ
)
, (6)
where the pretreatment outcome Y 0t′ has been replaced by the time
averages of Y 0i,τ and Y˜
0
i,τ before the treatment.
18 The estimator (6)
has no analytical variance, so standard errors are to be computed
by bootstrapping (i.e., resampling the observations of the control
group). Finally, the average of all possible ξˆi,t constitutes an unbiased
estimator of (2),
ξˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
ξˆi,t
)
, (7)
where N is the number of ITers in the sample and Ti is the number
of years ITer i has been conducting its monetary policy under an IT
regime.
2. Empirical Issues
Before presenting the propensity score estimations and the “inﬂation
outcomes” to be used in our evaluation, it is convenient to brieﬂy
discuss some issues regarding the dates the various central banks
adopted their IT regime, i.e., the period when treatment occurred.
2.1 Adoption Dates
In a number of cases, the exact IT adoption timing is unclear: authors
and central banks use diﬀerent criteria. To address this ambiguity
18Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005) suggest
using a weighted average of the pretreatment observations instead of a sole ob-
servation to control for possible outliers or trend eﬀects. In (6) we have used a
simple average (equal weights).
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and for the sake of robustness, we use two possible adoption dates
for each country. First, we consider dates when countries started
some form of IT (soft IT), typically by simply announcing numerical
targets for inﬂation or by stating that they were switching to IT. On
the other hand, we use dates of fully ﬂedged IT adoption, namely,
an explicit IT adoption as publicized by central banks and implying
numerical targets for inﬂation together with the absence of nominal
anchors other than the inﬂation target.19
Our approach contrasts with previous studies as it considers that
many developing-country ITers used a soft version of IT as a strategy
to reduce inﬂation from two-digit to international levels;20 once in-
ﬂation reached a stable low level, their central banks would reinforce
the regime, by abandoning other nominal anchors and committing
exclusively to target inﬂation. For example, Chile may appear as an
early IT adopter (1991) in other studies, but it ran exchange rate
regimes not compatible with fully ﬂedged IT until 1999. For Peru, au-
thors such as Corbo, Landarretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) use
a soft IT adoption date (1994), when the central bank announced an
inﬂation target consistent with a money growth operational target,
while Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) use its fully ﬂedged date
(2002).
The year of IT adoption for developed economies is less contro-
versial. In New Zealand, for instance, the beginning of IT can be
dated as far as 1988 when a numerical target for inﬂation was an-
nounced in the government budget statement. Or, following Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), it can be dated back to 1990 when the
ﬁrst Policy Targets Agreement between the minister of ﬁnance and
the governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was published,
specifying numerical targets for inﬂation and the dates by which
they were to be achieved. In 1991, a target range of 0 to 2 percent
for 1993 was announced.21
In the case of Sweden, we follow Ball and Sheridan (2005) for our
fully ﬂedged classiﬁcation given that the ﬁrst announced inﬂation
target was 2 percent for 1995 even though the Riksbank announced
19This information is available from the various central bank’s web sites.
20See Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2003) for a comprehensive survey of IT in
developing countries.
21The upper bound of this range was changed to 3 percent in the 1996 Policy
Target Agreement.
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its shift to IT during 1993. For Canada, the ﬁrst target range was
announced in 1991. In 1993, a range of 1 to 3 percent was established
for 1994 onward.
In table 1 we compare adoption dates among six diﬀerent studies
and provide our two possible adoption dates. The column labeled
“Class. 1” refers to the soft IT adoption dates, while “Class. 2”
accounts for fully ﬂedged IT adoption. In six cases we have more
than a three-year diﬀerence between both dates: Chile (eight years),
Colombia (four years), Israel (ﬁve years), Mexico (four years),
Peru (eight years), and Philippines (seven years). In others, such
as Australia and the United Kingdom, both classiﬁcations coincide.
2.2 Propensity Score Estimations
In order to estimate (3), we built a yearly data set for 109 countries
containing a set of variables that broadly deﬁne an economy (X).
The sources were the Penn World Table (PWT version 6.0) for GDP
per capita and national accounts data; the IFS for international
reserves, money, and credit markets data; and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2004) for exchange rate regimes.22
The variables entered in the regression are the averages of the ﬁve
years prior to the IT adoption for ITers. To check for robustness, for
non-ITers we use either the average since 1990 up to 2004 or the ﬁve
years previous to 1996 (for classiﬁcation 1) or 1998 (for classiﬁcation
2).23 As described earlier, we tested for the balancing hypothesis and
selected the most parsimonious speciﬁcation.
In table 2 we show the variables whose coeﬃcients were statis-
tically signiﬁcant in the four estimated models: from the PWT, in-
vestment to GDP, exports plus imports to GDP (namely, openness
ratio), and the share of world GDP (GDP for a particular country to
the sum of GDPs of the 109 countries in the database); from the IFS,
the ﬁscal balance to GDP, inﬂation and its coeﬃcient of variation
(inﬂation volatility), and the money-to-GDP ratio; ﬁnally, the aver-
age number of years that a country was classiﬁed as freely ﬂoating
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
22We also considered social indicators from the World Bank and other sources
for central bank staﬀ and geographical controls. These variables were not signi-
ﬁcative in the regressions.
23These are the average adoption dates in each classiﬁcation.
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Figure 1. Propensity Score Densities by IT Adoption Date
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Figure 1 displays the density of the propensity score for ITers
and non-ITers derived for each of the estimated models. It can be
seen that the densities for model (1) are close to those of model (3);
similarly, model (4) resembles model (2). For this reason, we will
work with the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, where the diﬀerences between
the propensities scores are driven by the alternative IT adoption
dates, and not by variations in the control group.
2.3 Inﬂation Outcomes
A shortcoming of working with a wide control group is the low avail-
ability of data. Even though the consumer price index (CPI) time
series are readily available for most of the countries, this is not
true with some interesting variables. Such is the case for inﬂation
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expectations (from surveys) or forecast errors (from polls) that are
directly inﬂuenced by IT adoption24 or cross-sectional higher mo-
ments (skewness and kurtosis) of the CPI distribution.
Hence, the outcomes we use are quantities that can be extracted
from conventional CPI data that broadly characterize inﬂation dy-
namics: level, variation, and persistence. We built a yearly data set
from quarterly CPI information from the IMF’s database (IFS), com-
puted the counterfactuals, and estimated the IT eﬀects as in (6) and
(7).25 For each year t the level of inﬂation is deﬁned as the mean
of the annualized quarterly inﬂation rates of years t and t − 1. The
same logic applies to the standard deviation of inﬂation, to measure
volatility.
The interesting debate on measuring inﬂation persistence26 can
be summarized in the equation
πt − µt = ρ(πt−1 − µt−1) +
p∑
τ=1
βτ∆(πt−τ − µt−τ ) + t (8)
that is a reparameterization of a simple AR(p) process for (πt −µt),
the deviation of inﬂation (πt) from its mean (µt). A common practice
is to set µt = µ and estimate the parameter ρ, which equals
the sum of all the autoregressive coeﬃcients in the original AR(p)
representation.27 The closer ρ is to one, the more persistent the
inﬂation.
However, Robalo Marques (2004) has pointed out that if the true
process in (8) has a time-varying mean, imposing µt = µ leads to
misleading conclusions. Particularly, a series that quickly reverts to a
24See Johnson (2002) for an application to a sample of selected countries.
25As a baseline we consider the pretreatment period to be the average of the
ﬁve years before the IT adoption (k in equation [6]), as we did in the propensity
score estimations. We also tried diﬀerent deﬁnitions, though the results were not
sensitive to this assumption.
It is important to note that the number of years after IT (Ti in equation
[7]) varies as IT adoption dates do. For classiﬁcation 1 [2] there are
∑N
i=1 Ti =
175 [132] post-IT observations.
26See Robalo Marques (2004) for a survey. This author also shows that the ap-
proach followed here to measure persistence, even though it has some limitations,
seems to be the most reliable among simple alternatives.
27It is well known that the OLS estimator of ρ is biased when ρ  1. An alter-
native (and popular) estimator, which is adopted here, is proposed in Andrews
and Chen (1994).
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time-varying mean may be estimated as highly persistent (ρ close to
one) if it is assumed to revert to an imposed constant level. To con-
trol for this undesirable eﬀect, he suggests estimating µt as a smooth
trend of πt. Considering this, we use two measures of inﬂation per-
sistence: the estimated ρ with µt = µ and with µt approximated by
the HP ﬁlter.28 To compute these quantities we use rolling windows
with between ten and ﬁfteen years of quarterly data.29
3. The Eﬀects of Inﬂation Targeting
In table 3 we present the estimated average eﬀects of IT for all
ITers, for the group of industrialized countries as well as develop-
ing ones. We report eﬀects on inﬂation dynamics according to our
two alternative classiﬁcations of IT adoption. In the spirit of the
mean-regression hypothesis of Ball and Sheridan (2005), we also in-
clude the results obtained by controlling for initial (pretreatment)
conditions.30
The ﬁrst key result is that IT has signiﬁcantly reduced mean in-
ﬂation in all the cases. In general, we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of soft IT
adoption are stronger than those of fully ﬂedged IT adoption. This
was expected due to high-inﬂation countries adopting IT to stabi-
lize (the dates in classiﬁcation 1). Also, the beneﬁts on developing
countries have been signiﬁcantly stronger than those on industrial-
ized ones, which conﬁrms previous ﬁndings in Bernanke et al. (1999),
Corbo, Landarretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), Neumann and von
Hagen (2002), and Pe´tursson (2004). The results also suggest that
regression to the mean is indeed an important phenomenon, since the
eﬀects of IT tend to be smaller once we control for initial conditions.
However, by considering substantially wider treatment and control
groups than the ones in Ball and Sheridan (2005), we ﬁnd that there
is no suﬃcient evidence to discard the beneﬁts of IT: IT matters for
mean inﬂation in both industrial and developing countries.
28We use a smoothing parameter of λ = 1, 600. Diﬀerent choices of λ do not
qualitatively change the results.
29The lag length in (8), p, was selected to minimize the Schwarz criterion.
30To control for initial conditions as in Ball and Sheridan (2005), we compute
the average treatment eﬀects on the treated on a new variable ei,t , which is
obtained as the residual of the regression Yi,t − Yi,t ′ = α + βYi,t ′ + ei,t .
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As mentioned in Faust and Henderson (2004), “Common wis-
dom and conventional models suggest that best-practice policy can
be summarized in terms of two goals: ﬁrst, get mean inﬂation right;
second, get the variance of inﬂation right.” Our ﬁnding regarding
mean inﬂation supports the idea that IT in fact helps in achiev-
ing the ﬁrst goal. What about the second goal? During the period
of analysis, inﬂation has been falling worldwide, and together, the
variance of inﬂation has been decreasing everywhere as well.31 Our
second ﬁnding precisely indicates that the observed fall in the vari-
ance of inﬂation has been particularly strong within ITers, such that
the treatment eﬀect has been that of a marked reduction in inﬂa-
tion volatility. The pattern of this eﬀect across country groups and
IT classiﬁcations is similar to the one found for the level of inﬂa-
tion. Neumann and von Hagen (2002) and Corbo, Landarretche, and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) also provide evidence suggesting that IT has
contributed to the fall in inﬂation volatility.32
What can we say about IT eﬀects on inﬂation persistence? As
mentioned, there is no straightforward theoretical prediction of the
eﬀects of IT on persistence. Adoption of IT can be linked to either
lower or higher inﬂation persistence; it all hinges on two opposing ef-
fects: how fast central banks allow inﬂation to revert back to its mean
after a shock and how price formation changes if expectations become
more anchored. Studies like Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) show
that persistence is lower in ITers than that in non-ITers, whereas Ball
and Sheridan (2005) show there is no evidence that ITers achieve
lower inﬂation persistence.33
We ﬁnd that the results depend on the measure of persistence
(ρ) used. If we consider a constant unconditional mean in the inﬂa-
tion process (µt = µ), we ﬁnd that IT increases persistence, though
the estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant and diﬀerent from zero.
Contrarily, if we allow for a time-varying mean inﬂation (µt = HP),
31See Pe´tursson (2004).
32Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005) suggest that IT increases in-
ﬂation uncertainty. The ﬁnding in Johnson (2002) in fact refers to volatility of
expected inﬂation from surveys, a variable related to observed inﬂation volatility
but with dynamics of its own.
33Time-series studies on persistence for industrial countries—like those of
Benati (2004), Levin and Piger (2004), or Robalo Marques (2004)—point to the
conclusion that high inﬂation persistence is not a robust feature of inﬂation pro-
cesses in the euro area or the United States.
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we ﬁnd that IT does reduce the persistence parameter. Interestingly,
some sort of mean regression is present under classiﬁcation 1 (soft
IT): once we control for the initial persistence, the fall in ρ disap-
pears. However, under classiﬁcation 2 (fully ﬂedged IT) the fall in ρ
is signiﬁcant even after controlling for mean regression (which seems
to exist in industrialized economies).
This last eﬀect, although diﬀerent from zero, is at most mod-
est. The half life of a shock to inﬂation is, roughly speaking, τ ≈
− ln(2)/ ln(ρ).34 The change in ρ implied by our results varies around
−0.04; hence, considering an initial ρ = 0.85,35 the change in τ is
just one quarter. All in all, the evidence on the eﬀect of IT on in-
ﬂation persistence, if any, is not as categorical as the one associated
with the reduction in mean and volatility.
4. Concluding Remarks
The increasing popularity of IT as a framework for conducting mon-
etary policy calls for the evaluation of its beneﬁts in comparison to
alternative schemes. In this study we have combined data of IT adop-
tion and inﬂation dynamics with program evaluation techniques to
assess the dimensions in which IT is a beneﬁcial regime. Our central
ﬁndings support the idea that the adoption of IT, either in its soft
or explicit form, delivers the theoretically promised outcomes: low
mean inﬂation (around a ﬁxed target or within a target range) and
low inﬂation volatility.
We also ﬁnd that IT has reduced the persistence of inﬂation in
developing countries. Given that IT is understood to be ﬂexible, the
reduction in persistence is likely to be the eﬀect of the anchoring of
expectations to a deﬁned nominal level. Nevertheless, the small mag-
nitude of the reduction is such that it prevents us from categorically
concluding in favor of IT in this particular dimension of the inﬂation
dynamics. In the future, it would be useful to contrast our results
with alternative measures of persistence. Also, a promising area for
further research is to formalize the theoretical link between IT, inﬂa-
tion persistence, and long-run expectations (credibility), which can
guide subsequent empirical eﬀorts.
34This formula is exact if the estimated model is an AR(1).
35This is a generous value. The sample mean of all our computed ρ after de-
trending is just below 0.40.
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The interpretation we gave to IT adoption, that of a “natu-
ral experiment,” allowed us to use powerful evaluation tools nor-
mally applied in microeconometrics. Yet, it is important to keep in
mind that the identifying assumption in a macroeconomic context
like ours might be stronger. We also reckon that the study of the
response of other macroeconomic variables (for instance, the busi-
ness cycles and interest rates) to IT is essential in order to have
a complete appraisal of the eﬀects of the IT regime. Hence, fu-
ture research can explore further, within the IT adoption evalua-
tion, the advantages of these techniques on a wider variety of macro
indicators.
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